题目：Principal-agent problem with time-inconsistent preferences
主讲人：黄文礼
时间：3月25日（周六）下午15: 00-16: 00
地点：3-309
主讲人简介：黄文礼，浙江财经大学中国金融研究院研究员，硕士生导师。研究方向为资产定价、公司金融、风险管理；先后在《系统工程理论与实践》、《数学学报》、《应用数学学报》、《Applied Stochastic Models in Business and Industry 》、《Applied Mathematics and Mechanics》等发表研究成果。
报告简介：We incorporate agent's time-inconsistent preferences into the Sannikov (2008) contract model to link the agent's personal traits with his own effort choice, consumption flow and the principal's profits. The results show that the time-inconsistent agent's impatience leads to a higher agency cost, which results in losses in the principal's profit and a lower consumption flow. We find the agent's time inconsistency implies more risks on the agent, which makes it harder to motivate the agent. Thus the incentive effort in our time-inconsistent model is always lower than that in the time consistent case, except the retirement points.
